Abstract. Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937) . Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004) . Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel's subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945) . Recently, it was noted that Hempel's intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006) .
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The distinction Hempel draws here is a crucial one, and it indicates that confirmation is really a three-place relation, between evidence (E), hypothesis (H), and a background corpus (K). This allows us to be a bit more precise still about Hempel's warning. The warning is not to conflate:
• (PC) (~Ba · ~Ra) confirms ( x) (Rx Bx) , relative to tautological background K T .
• (PC*) (~Ba · ~Ra) confirms ( x) (Rx Bx) , relative to background ~Ra.
Intuitively, it is pretty clear that (PC*) is false. After all, it seems clear that observing a (known) non-raven cannot tell us anything about the color of ravens. Or, to put things another way, if we already know that a is a non-raven, then we already know that a is neither a positive instance of nor a counterexample to the claim that all ravens are black. As such, observing its color does not (intuitively) provide any information relevant to whether or not all ravens are black. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that (PC) is false. If we know nothing about a, and then we observe it to be a non-black non-raven, this (intuitively) can tell us something relevant to whether or not all ravens are black, because such an observation can serve to reduce the number of (possible) counterexamples to the claim that all ravens are black. As such, this observation may well provide information that is relevant to whether or not all ravens are black (see Maher 1999 for a clear articulation of this line of argument). Hempel and Goodman provided an "independent argument" for (PC), which ran as follows:
If the evidence E consists only of one object which … is a non-raven [~Ra] , then E may reasonably be said to confirm that all objects are non-ravens [( x) ~Rx], and a fortiori, E supports the weaker assertion that all non-black objects are non-ravens [( x)(~Bx ~Rx)], i.e., that all ravens are black [( x) (Rx Bx) ].
This alternative argument for (PC) rests on four assumptions:
• A Slight Modification of the Nicod Condition (NC*): Hempel's first premise here is that "~Ra confirms ( x) ~Rx". This assumes a general principle that is close to (NC), since ~Ra is equivalent to Ta · ~Ra, where Tx is any predicate that tautologically applies to all objects (e.g., Tx = Rx ~Rx), and ( x) ~Rx is equivalent to ( x)(Tx ~Rx). If one already accepts (NC) and (EC), then (NC*) should also be acceptable.
• Monotonicity (M): If E confirms H, then E · X confirms H, for any X. This (or something akin to it -see fn. 4) is presupposed implicitly in the first step of the argument, which takes us from "~Ra confirms ( x) ~Rx" to "~Ra · ~Ba confirms ( x)
~Rx." As we will see below, assumption (M) -which is implied by Hempel's theory of confirmation -is rejected by contemporary confirmation theorists. We will also see that (M) is inconsistent with the (intuitive) Hempel-Goodman resolution of the paradox.
• Special Consequence Condition (SCC): For all propositions H 1 , H 2 , and E, if E confirms H 1 , and H 1 (classically) logically entails H 2 , then E confirms H 2 . This (or something akin to it) is assumed in the second step of the argument, which takes us from "~Ra · ~Ba confirms ( x) ~Rx" to "~Ra · ~Ba confirms ( x)(~Bx ~Rx)". (SCC) is another assumption which is implied by Hempel's theory of confirmation, but which is rejected by most contemporary confirmation theorists (see below).
• The Equivalence Condition (EC): This is assumed at the very end of the argument, which takes us from "~Ra · ~Ba confirms ( x)(~Bx ~Rx)" to "~Ra · ~Ba confirms
We mention this "independent argument" for (PC) not because it is more compelling than the original argument generating the paradox, but because it exposes several other key assumptions that Hempel and Goodman made about confirmation. These will become crucial, below.
Let's return now to (PC) vs (PC*). Even if you don't think that (PC) is clearly true, it should nonetheless be clear that (PC*) is false. Thus, Hempel and Goodman's explanation of the appearance of paradoxicality here -that it arises by conflating (PC) and (PC*) -is quite plausible and intuitive. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how this resolution could be available to them, since it contradicts their theory of confirmation! This is because their theory of confirmation implies (M). To see why, note that Hempel and Goodman theoretically explicate "E confirms H relative to K" as "E · K entails Z", where Z is a proposition obtained from the syntax of H and E in a certain complex way, which Hempel (1943 Hempel ( , 1945 specifies (the technical details of Hempel's theory of confirmation won't matter for present purposes). Of course, if E by itself (i.e., E · T for tautological T) entails Z, then so does E · X, for any X. As a result, in Hempel's confirmation theory, "E confirms H, relative to K T " implies "E · X confirms H, relative to K T ", for any proposition X. Thus, Hempel's theory implies (M). (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006) . As we will see below, this inconsistency has some rather important consequences for the ensuing historical dialectic. Before tracing this subtle historical trajectory, we pause to consider Quine's radically different approach to the paradox of confirmation.
Quine on the Paradox of the Ravens
In his influential paper "Natural Kinds", Quine (1969) 
Contemporary Bayesian Clarifications of (NC) and (PC)
As we saw above, Hempel (1945) provided a cautionary remark about the paradox. He warned us not to conflate the paradoxical conclusion (PC) with a distinct (intuitively) false conclusion (PC*) that (intuitively) does not follow from (NC) and (EC). It is clear that Hempel was onto something important with his intuitive distinction between claims (PC) and (PC*), but (as we saw above) his confirmation theory just lacked the resources to properly spell out his intuitions. This is where contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory really comes in handy.
In contrast to Hempelian confirmation theory (or, for that matter, other deductive theories of confirmation like hypothetico-deductivism), according to Bayesian confirmation theory, "E confirms H, given K", and "(E · K) confirms H, unconditionally" have quite different meanings.
Essentially, this is possible because Bayesian explications of the confirmation relation do not entail monotonicity (M). Specifically, contemporary Bayesians offer the following account of conditional and unconditional confirmation -where hereafter, we will use the words "confirms"
and "confirmation" in accordance with this Bayesian account:
is some suitable probability function.
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It is easy to see, on this account of (conditional and unconditional) confirmation, that there will be a natural distinction between (PC) and (PC*). From a Bayesian point of view this distinction becomes:
Charitably, this is the sort of distinction Hempel had in mind when he articulated his intuitions about the paradox. And, we think this is crucial for understanding the ensuing historical dialectic regarding the paradox. The important point here is that Bayesian confirmation theory has the theoretical resources to distinguish conditional and unconditional confirmation, but traditional (classical) deductive accounts (like Hempel's theory and H-D) do not. As a result, Bayesian theory allows us to precisely articulate Hempel's intuition concerning why people might (falsely)
believe that the paradoxical conclusion (PC) is false by conflating it with (PC*).
A key insight of Bayesian confirmation theory is that it represents confirmation as an irreducibly three-place relation between evidence E, hypothesis H, and background corpus K.
From this perspective the traditional formulation of the paradox is imprecise in an important respect: it leaves unclear which background corpus is presupposed in the (NC) -and, as a result, also in the (PC). In other words, there is a missing quantifier in the traditional formulations of (NC) and (PC). Here are four possible precisifications of (NC) [the corresponding precisifications of (PC) should be obvious]:
• (NC w ) For any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', there is some
• (NC ) Relative to our actual background corpus K , for any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', (Fa · Ga) confirms ( x)(Fx Gx), given K .
• (NC T ) Relative to tautological (or a priori) background corpus K T , for any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', (Fa · Ga) confirms ( x)(Fx Gx), given
• (NC s ) Relative to any possible background corpus K, for any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', (Fa · Ga) confirms ( x)(Fx Gx), given K.
Which rendition of (NC) is the one Hempel and Goodman had in mind? Well, (NC w ) seems too weak to be of much use. There is bound to be some corpus with respect to which non-black non-ravens confirm 'All non-black things are non-ravens', but this corpus may not be very interesting (e.g., the corpus which contains '(~Ba · ~Ra) ( x)(~Bx ~Rx)'!). What about (NC T )? As Maher (1999 Maher ( , 2004 skillfully explains, Hempel and Goodman (and Quine) have something much closer to (NC T ) in mind. Originally, the question was whether learning only (~Ba · ~Ra) and nothing else confirms that all ravens are black. And, it seems natural to understand this in terms of confirmation relative to "tautological (or a priori) background". We will return to the notion of "tautological confirmation", and the (NC ) vs (NC T ) controversy, below. But, first, it is useful to discuss I.J. Good's knock-down counterexample to (NC s ), and his later (rather humorous but also insightful) attempt to formulate a counterexample to (NC T ).
I.J. Good's Counterexample to (NC s ) and his "Counterexample" to (NC T )
Good (1967) asks us to consider the following example (we're paraphrasing here):
• Our background corpus K says that exactly one of the following hypotheses is true: (H) there are 100 black ravens, no non-black ravens, and 1 million other birds, or else (~H)
there are 1,000 black ravens, 1 white raven, and 1 million other birds. And K also states that an object a is selected at random from all the birds. Given this background K,
Hence, Good has described a background corpus K relative to which (Ra · Ba) disconfirms (Rx Bx) . This is sufficient to show that (NC s ) is false. Hempel (1967) responded to Good by claiming that (NC s ) is not what he had in mind, since it smuggles too much "unkosher" (a posteriori) empirical knowledge into K. Hempel's challenge to Good was (again, charitably) to find a counterexample to (NC T ). However, In light of the inconsistency in Hempel's own thinking about the paradox, it is unclear how we should (now) understand his challenge to Good. On its face, Hempel's challenge seems too strong, since all Hempel (1945) says is that antecedently knowing ~Ra undermines the confirmation ~Ra · ~Ba provides for ( x)(Rx Bx). He does not say that statistical information about the distribution of colors and species of objects in the universe will undermine this confirmation relation. As such, it seems that Good should have responded by (a) pointing out that Hempel's theory of confirmation contradicts his own caveat about empirical background knowledge, and (b) even if we bracket that inconsistency, Hempel's caveat does not seem to rule-out the kinds of statistical background information Good presupposes in his counterexample to (NC s ). Be that as it may, Good (1968) This "counterexample" to (NC T ) is far from conclusive, as stated [see Maher (1999) for a trenchant analysis of this passage]. Ultimately, the problem here is that in order to give a rigorous and compelling counterexample to (NC T ), one needs a theory of "tautological confirmation" -i.e., of "confirmation relative to tautological background". Good doesn't have such a theory (nor do most contemporary probabilists), which explains the lack of rigor and persuasiveness of "Good's Baby". However, Patrick Maher does have such an account; and he has applied it in his recent, neo-Carnapian, Bayesian analysis of the paradox of the ravens. Carnap (1950 Carnap ( , 1952 Carnap ( , 1971 Carnap ( , 1980 proposed various theories of "tautological confirmation" in terms of "logical probability". Recently Patrick Maher (1999 Maher ( , 2004 has brought a Carnapian approach to bear on the ravens paradox, with some very enlightening results. For our purposes it is useful to emphasize two consequences of Maher's neo-Carnapian, Bayesian analysis of the 13 paradox. First, Maher shows that (PC*) is false on a neo-Carnapian theory of (Bayesian) confirmation. That is, if we take a suitable class of Carnapian logical (or a priori) probability functions P c [• | •] -e.g., either those of Maher (1999) or Maher (2004) -as our "probabilities relative to tautological background", then we get the following result [see Maher (1999) ]
Maher's Neo-Carnapian Analysis of the Ravens Paradox
Intuitively, this says that observing the color of (known) non-ravens tells us nothing about the color of ravens, relative to tautological background corpus. This is a theoretical vindication of (NC T ) is false, and so is its Quinean "restriction" (QNC T ). That is, Maher (2004) Bayesians have largely rejected this Carnapian project, they take a rather different tack to handle the paradox of confirmation.
The Canonical Contemporary Bayesian Approaches to the Paradox
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, almost all contemporary Bayesians implicitly assume that the paradoxical conclusion is true. And, they aim only to "soften the impact" of (PC) by trying to establish certain comparative and/or quantitative confirmational claims. Specifically, Bayesians typically aim to show (at least) that the observation of a black raven, (Ba · Ra), confirms that all ravens are black more strongly than the observation of a non-black non-raven, (~Ba · ~Ra) does, relative to our actual background corpus K , which is assumed to contain no "unkosher" information about a in particular (although it will contain statistical information reflecting our beliefs about the distributions of things in the actual world, and so it will not be tautological).
Specifically, most contemporary Bayesians aim to show (at least) that relative to some measure c of how strongly evidence supports a hypothesis, the following COMParative claim holds: Bayesians, the salient probability is P[p | K ], which is to be interpreted as the rational epistemic probability of p, given an (actual) background knowledge corpus K (which is not tautological).
The typical Bayesian strategy is to isolate constraints on K that are as minimal as possible 
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• The Difference:
Measures d, r, and l all satisfy the following desideratum, for all H, E 1 , E 2 , and K:
But, interestingly, measure s does not satisfy ( †). So, if one uses either d, r, or l to measure confirmation, then one can establish the desired comparative claim simply by demonstrating that:
On the other hand, if one uses s, then one has a bit more work to do to establish the desired comparative conclusion, because (COMP P ) does not entail (COMP s ).
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Some Bayesians go farther than this by trying to establish not only the comparative claim (COMPc), but also the quantitative claim that the observation of a non-black non-raven confirms that "All ravens are black" to a "minute" degree. That is, in addition to the comparative claim, some Bayesians also go for the following QUANTative claim:
Let's begin by discussing the canonical contemporary Bayesian comparative analysis of the paradox. In essence, almost all such accounts trade on the following three assumptions about K , where it is assumed that the object a is sampled at random from the universe:
Basically, assumption (1) relies on our knowledge that (according to K ) there are more nonblack objects in the universe than there are ravens. This seems like a very plausible distributional constraint on K , since -as far as we actually know -it is true. Assumptions (2) and (3) In fact, (1)-(3) entail much more than (COMP P ), as the following theorem illustrates:
(1)-(3) also entail the following:
In other words, (4) tells us that assumptions (1)- (3) entail that the observation of a non-black non-raven confirms that all ravens are black -i.e., that the paradoxical conclusion (PC) is true.
And, (5) tells us that even according to s [a measure that violates ( †)] the observation of a black raven confirms that all ravens are black more strongly than the observation of a non-black nonravens does.
The fact that (1)- (3) entail (4) and (5) indicates that the canonical Bayesian assumptions go far beyond the comparative claim most Bayesians want. Why, for instance, should a Bayesian be committed to the qualitative paradoxical conclusion (PC)? After all, as Patrick Maher and I.J.
Good have made so clear, probabilists don't have to be committed to qualitative claims like (NC)
and (PC). It would be nice if there were assumptions weaker than (1)-(3) that sufficed to establish (just) the comparative claim (COMP P ), while implying no commitment to qualitative claims like (PC). Happily, there are such weaker conditions. But, before we turn to them, we first need to briefly discuss the quantitative Bayesian approaches.
Various Bayesians go farther than (COMP c ) in their analysis of the ravens paradox. They seek to identify (stronger) constraints, stronger background knowledge K , that entails both (COMP c ) and (QUANT c ). The most common strategy along these lines is simply to strengthen
(1), as follows:
, there are far fewer ravens than non-black things in the universe.
Recently, Peter Vranas (2004) has provided a very detailed analysis of quantitative Bayesian approaches to the ravens paradox along these lines. We won't dwell too much on the details of these approaches. Vranas does an excellent job of analyzing them. However, some brief remarks on a result Vranas proves and uses in his analysis are worth considering here.
Vranas shows that assumptions (1 ) and (3) (without (2)) are sufficient for (QUANT c ) to hold (i.e. for ( x)(Rx Bx) to be positively confirmed by (~Ba · ~Ra), given K , but only by a very small amount) for all four measures of confirmation d, r, l, and s. Moreover, he argues that in the presence of (1 ) , (3) is "approximately necessary" for (QUANT c ). What he proves is that, given
(1 ), and supposing that P[H | K ] is not too small, the following approximate claim is necessary for (QUANT c ):
Vranas then argues that Bayesians have given no good reason for this necessary (and sufficient) condition. Thus, he concludes, Bayesian resolutions of the paradox that claim non-black nonravens confirm by a tiny bit, due to assumption (1'), have failed to establish a condition they must employ to establish this claim -they have failed to establish (3'). 13 Vranas' claim that (3) is "approximately necessary" for (QUANT c ) may be somewhat misleading. It makes it sound as if (3) has a certain property. But, in fact, nothing about (3) itself follows from Vranas' results. It is more accurate to say (as Bob Dylan might) that "approximately (3)" [i.e., (3 )] is necessary for (QUANT c ). To see the point, note that (3) is a rather strong independence assumption, which entails many other identities, including: (3 ) is not an independence assumption. Indeed, (3 ) is far weaker than an independence assumption, and it does not entail the parallel approximates:
Vranas argues convincingly that strong independence assumptions like (3) [and (2) 
A New Bayesian Approach to the Paradox
In the comparative case, the primary aim is to establish (COMP P ). As we have seen,
Bayesians typically make two quite strong independence assumptions in order to achieve this goal. Happily, a perfectly satisfactory analysis of the ravens may be given that employs no independence assumptions at all.
In this section, we offer a solution to the raven paradox that is more general than other solutions we know of. It draws on much weaker assumptions. It solves the paradox in that it supplies quite plausible sufficient conditions for the observation of a black raven to confirm 'All ravens are black' more strongly than observation of a non-black non-raven would confirm it (see Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006 for necessary and sufficient conditions). These conditions do not draw on probabilistic independence (they are strictly weaker than the standard independence assumptions). And they in no way depend on whether Nicod's Condition (NC) is satisfied. Our conditions can be satisfied both in cases were a positive instance confirms that all ravens are black and in cases where a positive instance disconfirms that all ravens are black (as in Good's counterexample to NC s ).
Let 'H' abbreviate 'All ravens are black' i.e., '( x)(Rx Bx)'. Let 'K' be a statement of whatever background knowledge you may think relevant -e.g. K might imply, among other things, that ravens exist and that non-black things exist, (( x)Rx · ( x)~Bx). One object, call it 'a' will be observed for color and to see whether it is a raven. The idea is to assess, in advance of observing it, whether a's turning out to be a black raven, (Ra·Ba), would make H more strongly supported than would a's turning out to be a non-black non-raven, (~Ra·~Ba 
That is, we assume only that finding a to be a black raven neither absolutely proves nor absolutely falsifies 'All ravens are black'; and the same goes if a is found to be a non-black nonraven. In addition we assume that it is at least possible, given only background K, that a will turn out to be a non-black raven. And, finally, we assume that there are more non-black objects in the universe than there are ravens (which is the uncontroversial assumption (1) that appears in the orthodox Bayesian treatment of the paradox). Given these background assumptions about K, the following Theorem can be proven.
THEOREM. If P[H | Ra·K] P[H | ~Ba·K], then P[H | Ba·Ra·K] > P[H | ~Ba·~Ra·K].
Thus, pace Vranas, we have a much weaker sufficient condition for (COMP P ), which does not presuppose any kind of probabilistic independence (or even "approximate independence").
Moreover, unlike the strong independence assumptions in the traditional Bayesian accounts, the preconditions of our theorem do not imply (PC). 14 So, we have discovered a purely comparative Bayesian approach to the paradox of confirmation, which avoids the troubling independence assumptions that appear in traditional Bayesian accounts, and which does not require commitment to the paradoxical conclusion (PC). Intuitively, what our sufficient condition says is that the observation that a is a raven does not confirm that all ravens are black any less strongly than the observation that a is nonblack. We think this assumption is quite plausible (it is certainly far more plausible than the independence assumptions which Vranas rightly criticizes).
Other (more general) recent theorems for both the qualitative and quantitative cases are reported and discussed in detail in (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006 ).
Coda: Hempel meets Bayes?
As we have seen, most contemporary Bayesians (Maher 2004 is a notable exception here) accept (PC). In this sense, modern Bayesians are rather "Hempelian" at heart. Moreover, in his plausible and intuitive resolution of the paradox, Hempel appeals to "tautological" vs "nontautological" confirmation, which is a very Bayesian-friendly idea. Unfortunately, Hempel's Bayesian-friendly intuitions contradict his monotonic, deductive, non-Bayesian theory of confirmation. Putting these things together, we can formulate a two-pronged "Hempel-Bayes resolution" of the paradox. The first prong is to distinguish (PC) and (PC*) in their Bayesian forms: (PC ) and (PC* ). Plausibly, relative to our actual background knowledge, (PC*) is false (i.e., (PC* ) is false). On the other hand, (PC )'s truth-value will depend on the actual (known) statistical distribution of objects in the universe. This is enough to make the Hempel-Bayes point that conflating (PC ) and (PC* ) can generate the appearance of a paradox (e.g., if (PC ) turns out to be true). The second prong is that even if (PC ) should turn out to be true, only very weak conditions need to be satisfied in order to ensure that the observation of a non-black non-raven confirms that all ravens are black less strongly than the observation of a black raven does. This approach harnesses the power and richness of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory, without abandoning Hempel's original intuitions about the paradox of confirmation, and without saddling the contemporary confirmation theorist with commitments to either (NC) or (PC).
